China's recent omission of Korean peninsula denuclearization in its arms control white paper signals tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. Analysts attribute this shift to Beijing's focus on strategic rivalry with Washington. Experts warn of potential impacts on regional security.
Late last month, China released an updated white paper on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, revising its 2005 version. The document emphasizes an impartial stance on the Korean peninsula issue, promoting peace and political resolution, but notably omits any reference to the peninsula's denuclearization—a phrase long supported in prior statements. The 2005 paper explicitly stated that 'China supports denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,' and the 2017 Asia-Pacific security white paper committed to it through dialogue.
Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that Beijing has 'clearly shifted away' from mentioning denuclearization in official documents over the past year and a half. 'If Beijing can no longer bring itself to utter the phrase "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," that is, in effect, tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea,' he said, attributing it to pressure from Pyongyang complicating bilateral ties.
This shift occurs amid improving China-North Korea relations. In September, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended a military parade in Beijing, holding summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, pledging enhanced strategic coordination. In contrast, during Xi's 2019 visit to Pyongyang, he expressed willingness to contribute to peninsula denuclearization and regional stability.
Zhao described the decision as part of a 'broader recalibration' prioritizing competition with the United States, though it risks weakening Beijing's leverage over Pyongyang's nuclear restraint. North Korea has accelerated its nuclear program since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, supplying weapons and troops to Moscow in exchange for aid and technology. At an October military parade in Pyongyang, attended by Chinese Premier Li Qiang—the first such visit in 16 years—North Korea displayed solid-fuel Hwasong-20 ICBMs, reportedly aided by Russia.
Kim has rejected U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung's calls for denuclearization talks, demanding recognition as a nuclear state. Timothy Heath of the Rand Corporation called China's approach pragmatic, driven partly by Russia's support for Pyongyang's program, pressuring Beijing to stay neutral to maintain ties. Patrick Cronin of the Hudson Institute viewed it as a subtle protest against U.S. extended deterrence with South Korea and Japan.
The white paper opposes nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, criticizing a 'certain country' for seeking strategic superiority. In October, the U.S. approved South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine development, marking a departure from past opposition. Hankuk University professor Kang Jun-young interpreted the paper as an indirect signal that peninsula denuclearization is 'difficult,' given both Koreas' submarine pursuits. North Korea announced nuclear-powered submarine plans in 2021 and recently inspected a related shipyard.