In November 2025, Governor Cláudio Castro launched Operation Contenção in Complexo do Alemão, leading to over 100 deaths. Two weeks earlier, Rio Grande do Norte conducted Operation Território Seguro in Natal without shots fired, involving seizures and social services. These actions highlight opposing approaches to fighting organized crime.
Operation Contenção, launched last week by Governor Cláudio Castro (PL), marked his fourth bloody police action since taking command of Rio de Janeiro in 2021. Sharing the same intent and script as prior ones, it stood out for the multiplied casualties: over a hundred people died in Complexo do Alemão. Previous operations resulted in 28 deaths in Favela do Jacarezinho in May 2021; between 23 and 25 in Vila Cruzeiro in the same month of 2022; and 19 in July 2022 in Complexo do Alemão. There is no evidence these deaths diminished organized crime's control over those territories, and the same outcome is anticipated for the current operation, which included seizures of weapons and ammunition, as well as arrests.
Two weeks earlier, without fanfare, the Rio Grande do Norte government, backed by Senasp (National Secretariat for Public Security) and the Ministry of Justice, carried out Operation Território Seguro in Natal's west zone. Without a single shot fired, weapons and drugs were seized, and arrests made. In the area, services will be established to ensure basic civil rights for residents: conflict mediation and access to justice; delivery of personal documentation; support for women and children victims of violence; land regularization; environmental improvements like lighting and garbage collection; aid for at-risk youth; and permanent policing.
These initiatives, occurring in the same month, embody opposing conceptions for tackling organized crime in poor urban areas. One relies on brute force and bloody spectacle, which garners votes and normalizes barbarity. The other trusts in intergovernmental coordination, reliable information systems, and expertise from public security professionals. Operation Carbono Oculto follows a rational, multidimensional strategy akin to mafia activities. While armed confrontation is unavoidable against heavy weaponry, it should not be the democratic state's first or sole recourse, requiring clear protocols. These examples point to the possible start of an effective, civilized policy against organized crime, involving complex changes in laws, political behavior, and bureaucracies such as police, the Public Prosecutor's Office, judicial, and prison systems. Such an approach demands separating security from electoral disputes and courage to challenge the failed far-right security policy, still applauded by many.