Two opinion pieces in Folha de S.Paulo debate whether Brazil should adopt mixed district voting for deputy and councilor elections from 2030. The proposal, reported by Deputy Domingos Neto (PSD-CE), aims to balance local and proportional representation. One side highlights benefits for local and national issues, while the other warns of complexities and risks.
The debate on electoral reform resurfaces in Brazil, focusing on mixed district voting, proposed to replace the current proportional system from 2030. In the existing setup, states serve as plurinominal districts where deputies are elected proportionally based on their party's votes, using open lists ordered by individual vote tallies.
Under mixed district voting, voters would have two votes: one for a candidate in their district, elected by simple majority, and another for a closed party list that determines seat proportions. Half the seats would go to district winners, with district votes aggregated to calculate party representation, filling the rest from lists. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, the 46 federal deputies would be split into 23 districts of about 700,000 inhabitants each, with 10 in the capital and groupings in the interior.
Political scientists from FGV Eaesp argue in favor, stating the system ensures 'representatives who can discuss both local problems and broader policies and challenges', blending proportionality and geographic proximity, akin to the German model. They question its fit in Brazil, however, where formal districts might ease capture by criminal organizations in areas controlled by militias or drug trafficking, rather than preventing it. Brazil already operates informally in a district-like manner, with campaigns concentrated in territories to maximize votes.
Conversely, a FGV CPDOC researcher and author on electoral systems opposes it, pointing to three issues: complex territorial delineation by IBGE, vulnerable to political influence and potentially confusing between federal and state districts; the useful vote, harming smaller parties, such as a PSOL voter choosing PT to beat the right; and creating 'two categories of deputies', with district-elected focusing on local intermediation and list-elected on party work. He counters that it wouldn't block crime influence, as organizations could pressure district votes or place allies on lists. Recent reforms are still settling, making the change untimely and more complex.
Both sides agree the debate is overly simplistic, overlooking Brazilian specifics like open lists and informal territorial control.