The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on January 9, 2026, that it may review federal appeals-court decisions denying permission to file successive postconviction motions, and that a statutory bar on re-raising previously presented claims applies to state habeas petitions—not to federal prisoners’ motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
On January 9, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowe v. United States, a case about procedural limits on federal prisoners who seek to challenge their convictions or sentences after the law changes.
The case stems from Michael Bowe’s federal firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which carries mandatory consecutive penalties when the firearm offense is tied to a qualifying “crime of violence.” According to court records summarized in the Supreme Court opinion, Bowe received a mandatory consecutive 10-year term on top of a 14-year sentence, with the § 924(c) count tied to conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery as predicates.
After Bowe was sentenced, the Supreme Court narrowed what qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). In United States v. Davis (2019), the Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B)—the statute’s “residual clause”—is unconstitutionally vague. Later, in United States v. Taylor (2022), the Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), the “elements clause.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has also held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a § 924(c) “crime of violence.”
But federal law tightly restricts second or successive postconviction challenges. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), a prisoner generally may file a successive motion only if it relies on newly discovered evidence establishing innocence, or on “a new rule of constitutional law” made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
Bowe’s attempts to obtain permission from the 11th Circuit to file a successive § 2255 motion illustrate how those limits can interact with later Supreme Court decisions. After Davis, a three-judge panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retroactive constitutional rule, but it concluded Bowe still could not make the required prima facie showing because then-binding circuit precedent treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a valid predicate under the elements clause. After Taylor eliminated that fallback theory, Bowe again sought authorization. The 11th Circuit dismissed the portion of his request relying on Davis on the theory that the claim had already been “presented” and therefore was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and it rejected the Taylor-based portion because Taylor was not a new constitutional rule for purposes of § 2255(h).
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve two questions that had divided lower courts.
First, the Court held that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of authorization requests by federal prisoners seeking to file successive § 2255 motions. The relevant certiorari bar in the habeas statute applies to the denial of authorization to file a second or successive “application,” language the Court read as referring to state-prisoner filings under § 2254 rather than federal-prisoner “motions” under § 2255.
Second, the Court held that § 2244(b)(1)—a provision that bars certain “claims presented in a prior application”—does not apply to second or successive motions filed by federal prisoners under § 2255(h). Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor said courts may not “graft additional restrictions onto the federal scheme simply because they think the result would be cleaner or more restrictive.”
The decision does not eliminate other hurdles for federal prisoners seeking successive relief, including the strict gateways in § 2255(h) and other procedural limits such as statutes of limitations. But by rejecting the application of § 2244(b)(1) to federal successive motions and allowing Supreme Court review of federal authorization denials, the ruling removes procedural barriers that had prevented some federal prisoners from obtaining merits review after later changes in the law.
The Court vacated the judgment below and sent Bowe’s case back to the 11th Circuit to apply the correct standards. For Bowe, the ruling provides another opportunity to seek authorization to argue that, after Davis and Taylor, his § 924(c) enhancement lacks a valid “crime of violence” predicate.
