The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to hear arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, a case that tests the president’s authority to remove members of independent agencies. The dispute centers on whether President Donald Trump could lawfully dismiss Federal Trade Commission member Rebecca Slaughter, a decision that could have broad implications for the balance of power between the executive branch and Congress.
The case known as Trump v. Slaughter is described in the available source material as a pending Supreme Court dispute over presidential removal power at independent agencies, involving Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter. Because direct access to the cited Slate article is blocked, some procedural details such as exact filing dates, lower‑court holdings, and the Court’s internal timeline cannot be independently confirmed from that source.
What is clear and historically verifiable is that the FTC was created by Congress in 1914 as an independent agency. It is led by five commissioners, no more than three of whom may be from the same political party, and they serve staggered seven‑year terms. By statute, commissioners are removable by the president only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” a protection the Supreme Court upheld in its 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.
The current dispute is framed against that backdrop. Commentators have reported that Trump v. Slaughter asks whether a president may remove an FTC commissioner outside the statutory “for cause” grounds based on a broad reading of Article II. According to those accounts, the case is viewed as a vehicle that could invite the Court to revisit or narrow Humphrey’s Executor and expand presidential control over independent agencies.
Underlying the controversy is the unitary executive theory, which holds that the Constitution vests all executive power in the president and therefore gives the president sweeping authority to direct and, if necessary, remove executive officials. Supporters point to early debates known as the “Decision of 1789,” in which members of the First Congress discussed whether the president alone could remove the secretary of foreign affairs. Critics, including many contemporary scholars, argue that the Constitution allows Congress to structure agencies and give certain officials tenure protections that cabin at‑will removal.
Historical practice reflects both strands. While presidents have long removed many executive officers at will, Congress has also created a series of independent or quasi‑independent bodies whose members enjoy tenure protections. Early examples include multi‑member commissions and boards in which the president’s removal power was constrained by statute. During the 19th century, influential figures such as Justice Joseph Story and Senator Daniel Webster discussed Congress’s ability to shape the administrative state, and in the 20th and 21st centuries Congress repeatedly established independent agencies with for‑cause removal provisions. Those arrangements formed part of the understanding the Supreme Court endorsed in Humphrey’s Executor and subsequent cases.
Legal analysts note that the outcome in Trump v. Slaughter could affect a wide range of federal entities whose leaders currently enjoy for‑cause protections. A ruling that significantly expands at‑will removal authority could enable a president to replace agency heads more freely and alter the degree of independence those bodies currently exercise. Some discussion in the broader debate has focused on whether certain institutions, such as the Federal Reserve, might be treated differently or carved out because of their distinctive role in economic policy, though how the Court might handle any such distinctions remains uncertain.
Because the full procedural record and the Supreme Court’s internal calendar for Trump v. Slaughter are not publicly verifiable from the provided source, the precise status of the case—such as the exact date of oral argument or any interim orders—cannot be definitively stated here. What can be said with confidence is that the case is part of a broader, long‑running fight over the scope of presidential control of the administrative state and the continuing force of Humphrey’s Executor.